The establishment of this new logic and structure of rule has gone hand in hand with 'the realization of the world market and the real subsumption of global society under capital'. 1 The world of nation-states and competing imperialisms of modern times 'served the needs and furthered the interests of capital in its phase of global conquest. At the same time, however, it created and reinforced rigid boundaries . . . that effectively blocked the free ow of capital, labor and goods -thus necessarily precluding the full realization of the world market'. 2 As capital realises itself in the world market, it 'tends toward a smooth space de ned by uncoded ows, exibility, continual modulation, and tendential equalization'.
3
The idea of Empire as a 'smooth space' is a central theme of the book. The smoothing does not just affect the division of the world into nation-states and their empires, merging and blending the distinct national colours 'in the imperial global rainbow'. 4 Most signi cant, it affects its division into First, Second and Third Worlds, North and South, core and periphery. While the Second World has disappeared, the Third World 'enters into the First, establishes itself at the heart as the ghetto, shanty town, favela'. 5 The First
World, in turn, 'is transferred to the Third in the form of stock exchanges and banks, transnational corporations and icy skyscrapers of money and command'. 6 As a result, 'center and periphery, North and South no longer de ne an international order but rather have moved closer to one another '. 7 As in most accounts of globalisation, Hardt and Negri trace its origins to the new power that the computer and information revolution has put in the hands of capital. By making it possible 'to link together different groups of labor in real time across the world', the revolution enabled capital 'to weaken the structural resistances of labor power' and 'to impose both temporal exibility and spatial mobility'. 8 Speculative and nancial capital strengthen the tendency by going 'where the price of labor is lowest and where the administrative force to guarantee exploitation is highest'. 9 As a result, 'the countries that still maintain the rigidities of labor and oppose its full exibility and mobility are punished, tormented, and nally destroyed'. because it was threatened by the development of immaterial labor; because it knew that the transversal mobility and hybridization of world labor power opened the potential for new crises and class con icts on an order never before experienced. The restructuring of production . . . was anticipated by the rise of a new subjectivity . . . was driven from below, by a proletariat whose composition had already changed.
12
On the other hand, this new proletariat -or 'multitude', as Hardt and Negri call it -promptly seized the new opportunities of empowerment and liberation created by globalisation. The key practice in this respect has been migration. 'The multitude's resistance to bondage -the struggle against the slavery of belonging to a nation, an identity, and a people, and thus the desertion from sovereignty and the limits it places on subjectivity -is entirely positive. . . . The real heroes of the liberation of the Third World today may really have been the emigrants and the ows of population that have destroyed old and new boundaries'. 13 The multitude is thus both protagonist and bene ciary of the destruction of boundaries that marks the coming of Empire.
Lineages of Empire 5
Moreover, the very globalisation of capital's networks of production and control empowers each and every point of revolt. In an article rst published in Italian in 1972, I pointed out some crucial differences between the incipient capitalist crisis of the 1970s and the crises of 1873-96 and of the 1930s. The most important among these differences was the role of workers' struggles in precipitating the crisis of the 1970s. I further maintained that this and other differences meant that the incipient crisis was less likely than the earlier crises to result in an intensi cation of inter-imperialist rivalries and a consequent break up of the world market.
Rather, the crisis could be expected to result in a strengthening of the unity of the world market and of the tendency towards the decentralisation of industrial production towards capitalistically 'less developed' regions of the global economy.
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In The Geometry of Imperialism, published six years later, I carried this analysis one step further. Not only did I underscore again that the kind of world-economic integration via direct investment that had developed under US hegemony was less likely to break down in a generalised state of war among capitalist powers than the kind of world-economic integration via commodity and nancial ows typical of nineteenth-century British hegemony. In addition, I pointed out that workers' struggles consolidated this new form of world-economic integration and suggested that, over time, the consolidation could be expected to weaken nation-states as the primary form of political organisation of world capitalism. 24 It followed from this argument that the very theories of 'imperialism' that had been most successful in predicting trends in the rst half of the twentieth century 25 had become hopelessly obsolete. These theories had become obsolete for the simple reason that world capitalism as instituted under US hegemony was no longer generating the tendency towards war among capitalist powers that constituted their speci c explanandum. And, to the extent that the system of nation-states was actually ceasing to be the primary form of political organisation of world capitalism, the obsolescence of these theories would become permanent.
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Twelve years later 27 I recast these arguments in an account of the 'long' twentieth century that focused on the rise of the world labour movement in the late nineteenth century, the bifurcation of the movement into socialdemocratic and Marxist trajectories in the early twentieth century, the success of workers struggles along both trajectories in provoking a fundamental, 'reformist' re-organisation of world capitalism under US hegemony at the end of the Second World War, and the crisis that both kinds of movements faced in the 1980s as the unintended consequence of their previous successes. Although we also noted a certain acceleration in the pace of world-systemic transformations, past experience seems to suggest that the present transition from the nation-state to a world-state phase of world rule will take at least a century to complete. It also suggests that at least some national states or hybrid forms of nation-and world-state may be protagonists of the transition.
As in Hardt and
Second, much of the uncertainty surrounding ongoing transformations derives from the fact that past periods of nancial expansion and hegemonic transition have been moments of increasing instability and unintended capitalist self-destructiveness. Although a major factor of past instability and self-destructiveness (inter-imperialist wars) is unlikely to intervene, the attempt of today's declining hegemonic power (the United States) to impose on the world an exploitative domination may well become a more important source of instability and self-destructiveness than similar attempts by its In short, Empire may indeed be in the making, but, if it is, it may well take a century or more before humanity will know whether its constitution has succeeded or failed, and if it has succeeded, what its social and cultural contents will be. In the meantime, all we can hope for is that the ruling classes of the declining and rising centres of the global economy deploy in their actions a greater intelligence than they have done so far; that proletarian struggles shun patriarchalist, racist and national-chauvinistic temptations;
and that activists and intellectuals of goodwill develop a better understanding of where Empire is coming from and where it can and cannot go.
